By Bimal Krishna Matilal, Arindam Chakrabarti (auth.), Bimal Krishna Matilal, Arindam Chakrabarti (eds.)
Never ahead of, in any anthology, have modern epistemologists and philosophers of language come jointly to handle the only such a lot missed vital factor on the confluence of those branches of philosophy, specifically: will we know proof from trustworthy studies? in addition to Hume's subversive dialogue of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by means of such a lot Western philosophers; while in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of proof and data philosophical debates have raged for hundreds of years concerning the prestige of word-generated knowledge.
`Is the reaction "I was once informed via knowledgeable at the topic" as first rate as "I observed" or "I inferred" in solution to "How do you know?"' is a question replied in assorted and refined methods through Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the 1st time this publication makes on hand the riches of these debates, translating from Sanskrit a few modern Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic money owed of that means and knowledge.
For complex undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or the United States - on epistemology, thought of that means, Indian or comparative philosophy, in addition to for experts attracted to this really clean subject of information transmission and epistemic dependence this e-book may be a feast.
After its ebook analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy can have no excuse for shunning every one other.
Read Online or Download Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony PDF
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Additional resources for Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony
We only questioned whether that true cognition can be reduced to inference. In this section, we shall raise the more radical question, whether merely linguistic utterances can at all produce a true cognition of whatever the utterances are about. 48, Uddyotakara anticipates three objections against the claim that linguistic utterances by themselves can generate a true cognition. e. if they are not heard, do not produce knowledge. Second, a word does not have an object of its own which is not presented by either perception or inference.
The answer would still be: there is no sentential meaning as an abstract entity in any case, and since the sentence is false, there is no relational fact in the world that could be grasped. So besides the word-meanings (Le. the referents of the words) there is nothing else in the case of a false sentence. But let us persist: are not pseudo-understanding of a false sentence (before its falsity has been discovered) and genuine knowing on hearing a true sentence being uttered by a competent speaker, are not these two mental states phenomenologically indistinguishable and if so why should not there be a common description of them?
Another argument appeals to the introspective datum that in the cases under consideration the cogniser says "I have known this from the utterances of that speaker" rather than "I have inferred". Some other authors appeal to the psychological evidence that one grasps the meaning of the sentence uttered so quickly that there is hardly any time adequate enough for an inferential process to take place. Finally, there is an argument that in the cases under consideration there is no relation of invariable co-presence, for the same sound may mean different things in different parts of the world.